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of-use#LAAClass  and  Politics  in  Wilhelmine  Germany: 
The  Center  Party  and  the  Social  Democrats 
in 
Wurttemberg 
DAVID  G.  BLACKBOURN 
BETWEEN 
1890  and  1914  the  Center  party  was,  in  Friedrich 
Naumann's  words,  "the  measure  of  all  things"  in  German 
politics.1  Throughout  this  period  it  possessed  a  quarter  of  the 
seats  in  the  Reichstag,  and  held  the  balance  of  power  between  left  and 
right.  Its  importance  fiom  the  standpoint  of  Bismarck's  successors  as 
chancellor  stemmed  from  the  electoral  and  parliamentary  decline  ofthe 
National  Liberals  and  Conservatives,  the  parties  which  had  formed  the 
Kartell  through  which  Bismarck  governed  the  Reichstag.  After  1890 
these  no  longer  commanded  a  majority,  and  other  parties  had  to  be 
won  over  by  the  government.2  With  the  Social  Democrats  perma? 
nently  hostile,  this  narrowed  the  government's  choice  down  to  the 
Progressives  and  Center,  either  of  which  would  give  the  Kartell  parties 
a majority,  and  both  of  which  were  to  be  used  to  this  effect.  However, 
the  Progressives  were  used  only  sparingly  (above  all  during  the  Biilow 
Bloc  of  1907-9)  because  of  their  increasing  shift  to  the  left.  The  historic 
reason  for  this  was  the  party's  antimilitarism;  and  this  move  to  the  left 
was  reinforced  by  fears  among  Progressive  leaders  that  their  supporters 
might  otherwise  defect  to  the  Social  Democrats.  The  Center  was  there? 
fore  the  only  alternative.3  For  most  ofthe  Wilhelmine  period  successive 
I should like to thank Geoff Eley, Joseph Lee, and Norman  Stone for their criticisms 
and advice. 
1. F. Naumann, Die politischen  Parteien (Berlin, 1910), p. 39. 
2. J. C. G. Rohl, Germany  without  Bismarck  (London, 1967), pp. 45-46; D.  Stegmann, 
Die  Erben Bismarcks:  Parteien  und Verbdnde  in der Spdtphase  des wilhelminischen  Deutsch? 
lands; Sammlungspolitik,  i8g7~igo2 (Cologne,  1970), pp. 29-31. 
3. A Hohenlohe memorandum in 1898 (after the Reichstag elections) summed up the 
dilemma: "The election statistics  provide irrefutable evidence that it will not be possible 
in the forseeable future to form a majority from the so-called national parties. One must 
therefore seek to win over one ofthe  opposition parties.  The only party which comes into 
consideration here is the Center, the overwhelming  part of which is monarchist." C. zu 
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chancellors  depended  for  their  parliamentary  majorities  on  the  Center, 
which  in  turn  showed  itself  willing  to  become  a  "party  of  govern? 
ment."4 
Surprisingly,  recent  work  on  the  "democratization"  of  German  poli? 
tics  before  1914  has  largely  passed  over  the  key  role  ofthe  Center  Party. 
Attention  has  focused  instead  on  changes  within  German  liberalism  and 
social  democracy,  and  on  the  related  attempts  to  build  a  bloc  from 
Bassermann  to  Bebel,  from  the  National  Liberals  to  the  Social  Demo? 
crats.5  Yet  there  was  another  potential  alignment  of  Wilhelmine  parties, 
involving  the  Center:  a  "Gladstonian  coalition"6  of  the  center-left, 
formed  by  the  Center,  Progressives,  and  Social  Democrats.  These 
parties  together  had  a  Reichstag  majority  at  all  times  after  1890.  An 
alliance  formed  by  them  would  have  exerted  serious  pressure  on  the 
undemocratized  political  and  constitutional  systems  of  the  Reich;  and 
given  a  degree  of  flexibility  among  Germany's  pre-1914  rulers?which 
recent  writers  have  suggested  was  greater  than  once  assumed?such  an 
alliance  might  have  precipitated  reforms.  The  effectiveness  ofa  center- 
left  alignment  was  never  put  to  the  test  prior  to  1914,  but  later  events 
indicated  its  potential  impact.  It  was,  after  all,  these  three  parties  which 
moved  resolutely  in  support  of  Erzberger's  1917  Peace  Resolution;  and 
it  was  their  successor  parties  in  the  "Weimar  Coalition"  which  became 
the  principal  supporters  of  democratic  institutions  in  the  early  1920s. 
By  adhering  to  an  alliance  of  this  kind,  the  Center  itself  might  have 
anticipated  later  events,  and  developed  into  the  constitutional  conserva? 
tive  party  within  a  genuinely  parliamentary  system  which  (as  the 
CDU/CSU)  it  has  since  become.  It  chose,  however,  to  join  with  the 
Progressives  and  Social  Democrats  only  sporadically  before  1914?in 
Hohenlohe,  Denkwurdigkeiten  der Reichskanzlerzeit, ed.  K.  A.  von  Miiller  (Stuttgart, 
1931), pp. 451-53.  For earlier calculations by Caprivi leading to the same conclusion, see 
Rohl,  p. 80. 
4. R.  Morsey,  "Die  deutschen  Katholiken  und  der Nationalstaat  zwischen  Kultur- 
kampf und dem ersten Weltkrieg,"  Historisches  Jahrbuch  90  (1970): 31-64. 
5. B. Heckart,  From Bassermann  to Bebel (New  Haven,  1974).  See also  G.  Schmidt, 
"Parlamentarisierung oder  'Praventive  Konter-Revolution'?  Die  deutsche Innenpolitik 
im  Spannungsfeld konservativer  Sammlungsbewegung  und latenter Reformbestrebun- 
gen  1907-1914,"  in  Gerhard A.  Ritter,  ed.,  Gesellschaft,  Parlament und Regierung: Zur 
Geschichte  des  Parlamentarismus  in Deutschland  (Dusseldorf, 1974), pp. 249-78;  and "Innen- 
politische  Blockbildungen  am  Vorabend  des  Ersten  Weltkriegs,"  Das  Parlament 20 
(1972): 3-32. 
6. A. Rosenberg,  The Birth ofthe  German  Republic, 1871-^18,  trans. I. F. D.  Morrow 
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opposition  to  the  "Big"  Military  Bill  of  1893,  in  support  of  Caprivi's 
trade  treaties,  over  the  Zabern  affair.  For  the  most  part  the  Center 
threw  its  votes  behind  the  traditional  parties  of  property  on  the  right, 
and  particularly  the  Conservatives. 
This  article  is  an  attempt  to  explain  the  alignment  of  the  Center.  It 
aims  to  show,  first,  some  of  the  resaons  why  the  party  at  Reich  level 
should  have  found  cooperation  with  the  left,  especially  with  the  Social 
Democrats,  so  difficult.  Secondly,  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  party's 
political  attitudes  and  policies  in  one  German  state,  Wurttemberg,  pro? 
vides  a  case  study  by  means  of  which  the  general  arguments  put  for? 
ward  can  be  tested. 
The  Social  Democratic  attitude  toward  the  Church  was  one  important 
obstacle  to  better  relations  with  the  Center.  The  former  regarded  reli? 
gious  belief  as a private  matter,  but  in  practice  the  party  was  consistently 
hostile  to  the  Church,  critical  both  of  its  teachings  and  of  its  social  role. 
The  Center  had  laid  the  foundations  of  its  formidable  political  position 
in  the  1870s,  in  defending  the  Church  and  its  members  against  Bis? 
marck's  Kulturkampf:  while  the  Social  Democrats  had  not,  in  fact,  sup? 
ported  this  assault  on  the  Church,  the  Center  nevertheless  viewed 
Bebel's  "State  of  the  Future"  (Zukunftsstaat)  as  suspiciously  as  it  had 
regarded  the  "Josephinism"  of  Bismarck  and  Falk.  In  the  years  after 
1890,  Center  fears  for  the  autonomy  of  the  Church  were  kept  alive 
particularly  by  the  constant  attacks  of  both  Progressives  and  Social 
Democrats  on  clerical  control  over  education;7  and  on  numerous  other 
issues,  from  the  admissibility  of  cremation  to  the  sanctity  ofthe  family, 
Social  Democratic  views  crossed  those  of  the  Center. 
Several  points  have  to  be  made  here,  however.  First,  these  differences 
were  no  less  real  in  the  Weimar  Republic,  when  they  did  not  prevent  a 
substantial  measure  of  cooperation  between  the  two  parties.  Secondly, 
the  Center  was  never  simply  a Catholic  or  clerical  party.  The  name  and 
program  of  the  party  were  chosen  to  attract  a  broad,  nonconfessional 
following,  and  a number  of  Protestants  joined  the  Reichstag  group,  the 
most  prominent  being  Ludwig  von  Gerlach.8  At  the  same  time,  many 
7- See, for example, the Center leader Hertling on the importance ofthe  struggle over 
education in Prussia: G. von  Hertling, Erinnerungen  aus meinem  Leben, 2 vols.  (Munich, 
1919-20),  2: 98-99. 
8. JE.  Hiisgen, Ludwig Windthorst  (Cologne,  1911), p. 95. David  G.  Blackbourn  223 
clerical  Catholic  politicians  spurned  the  Center  at  its  inception,  and 
other  frustrated  clerical  diehards  continued  to  do  so  at  regular  intervals 
over  the  years.  Even  in  the  early  years  of  its  existence  the  Center  stood 
for  more  than  just  Catholic  resentment  against  a  two-thirds  Protestant 
state.  The  party  identified  itself  too  with  south  German  opposition  to  a 
Prussian-based  Reich,  and  with  the  dissatisfaction  of  economically  back- 
ward  regions  and  social  groups  at  incorporation  within  a  large,  dy- 
namic  political  unit.  The  support  which  the  Center  received  from  the 
Protestant  Guelphs,  backward,  traditionalist,  and  anti-Prussian,  is  sig? 
nificant;  and  when  party  leaders  later  looked  back  with  distaste  on  the 
National  Liberal  hegemony  ofthe  1870s,  it  was  not  only  the  Kultur? 
kampf  they  had  in  mind,  but  the  disturbance  of  old  ways  of  life  by  the 
thrust  of  industry  and  commerce  unleashed  by  new  and  liberal  busi? 
ness  codes. 
Thirdly,  relations  between  the  Social  Democrats  and  the  Center  de- 
teriorated  from  the  1890s,  at  a  time  when  the  latter  was  sloughing  off 
those  clerical  remnants  of  its  character  which  remained.  With  the  dis- 
mantling  o(Kulturkampf  legislation  and  the  decline  in  the  persecution  of 
Catholics,  the  Center  drew  a dwindling  return  from  electoral  appeals  to 
confessional  loyalty.9  The  increasing  fragility  of  its  hold  on  Catholics  as 
Catholics  was  a  source  of  serious  concern  to  party  leaders,  who  began 
to  emphasize  the  popular,  social  policies  ofthe  Center,  and  to  call  for  an 
end  to  confessional  politics.10  Support  for  tariffs  and  for  social  legisla? 
tion  like  stock  exchange  controls  testified  to  the  growing  adherence  of 
Center  leaders  to  a  secular  Sozialpolitik.  The  responsiveness  of  party 
leaders  to  popular  feeling,  and  their  resistance  to  the  idea  ofthe  Center 
as  a  clerical  party,  were  brought  out  by  their  behavior  in  1887,  over 
Bismarck's  Seven  Year  Military  Bill,  and  in  1893,  over  Caprivi's  "Big" 
Military  Bill.  On  both  occasions  the  government  tried  to  put  pressure 
on  the  party,  through  Rome,  to  support  measures  which  were  unpop- 
9. Center leader Porsch, in an 1893 memorandum  to Cardinal Kopp, wrote  ofthe  de? 
clining impact of such appeals: "People now  weigh  things up much more coolly,  where 
once they followed  without  thinking,"  quoted in H. Gottwald,  "Zentrum und Imperial? 
ismus" (Ph.D diss., University  of Jena, 1966), p. 129. Also, T. Nipperdey,  Die Organisa- 
tion der deutschen  Parteien vor 1918 (Dusseldorf,  1961), p. 268. On  the Center's declining 
share ofthe  Catholic vote,  see below,  p. 248, and n. 78. 
10. It was in this context  that Julius Bachem made his famous appeal for a move  away 
from  the  politics  of  confessional  isolation  ("Wir  miissen  aus dem  Turm  heraus"). J. 
Bachem,  Erinnerungen  eines alten Publizisten und Politikers (Cologne,  1913),  pp- 177-955 
L.  Bergstrasser,  Geschichte der politischen Parteien in  Deutschland (Munich,  1960),  pp. 
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ular  with  the  mass  of  Center  voters:  on  both  occasions  the  Center  re? 
fused  to  be  swayed  by  clerical  overtures.  The  line  followed  by  Center 
leaders  brought  electoral  success,  and  pointed  up  the  isolated  position 
within  the  party  of  clerical  intriguers  like  Archbishop  Kopp  of  Bres? 
lau.11 
It  is  perhaps  worth  pointing  out  the  sharp  contrast  with  France, 
where  political  Catholicism  suffered  from  the  interference  ofa  conser? 
vative  hierarchy  which  first  delayed  Ralliement  by  its  obdurate  resis? 
tance,  and  then  damned  the  movement  by  its  support.  The  respective 
roles  of  the  parish  clergy  provide  a  telling  sign  of  the  difference  be? 
tween  the  two  countries.  In  France,  priests  who  organized  the  local 
Catholic  peasantry,  as  in  Brittany,  were  strongly  discouraged  by  the 
hierarchy,  and  their  efforts  were  never  able  to  feed  the  sickly  growth  of 
popular  social  Catholicism.  In  Germany  things  were  very  different. 
Priests  played  a  major  role  as  local  political  organizers  of  the  Center 
party:  they  sat  in  state  legislatures  as  spokesmen  for  small-town  in? 
terests,  acted  as  unofficial  election  agents,  and?with  great  attention  to 
the  practicalities?ran  many  of  the  artisan  and  peasant  associations 
which  did  so  much  to  keep  these  groups  within  the  Center  fold.12 
As  parties  orientated  toward  the  social  question,  Center  and  Social 
Democrats  in  fact  had  much  in  common.  Drawing  their  support  largely 
from  the  poorest  parts  of  the  population,  they  formed  the  two  great 
mass  parties  in  Wilhelmine  politics,  equipped  with  the  most  extensive 
auxiliary  organizations  rooted  among  the  people.  Significantly,  it  was 
in  the  Center  and  Social  Democratic  parties  that  career  politicians  like 
Erzberger  and  Ebert  first  rose  through  the  party  ranks  to  achieve  prom- 
inence.  Both  parties  had  suffered  under  "exceptional  legislation,"  and 
were  opposed  to  its  use;  and  both,  having  gained  electoral  support  and 
li.  Kopp's persistent efforts to  swing  the Center behind the 1893 military bill were 
unsuccessful, and when Caprivi asked him to use his position to modify the party's 1893 
electoral strategy, Kopp was obliged to admit his lack of influence outside the narrow 
area of Silesia. See Gottwald, pp. 127-40. In 1898 Hohenlohe also sought to use Kopp to 
guide Center strategy, and the latter was once again forced to confess his inability to do so. 
Hohenlohe,  pp. 450-51. 
12. The  Christian Peasant Associations in  Wurttemberg  (Anton  Keilbach),  Baden 
(Philipp Gerber and Josef Pfaff), and Trier (Georg Dasbach) were organized by priests. 
The associations arranged for the provision of credit, the purchase of feedsturfs and fer- 
tilizer, and the cooperative marketing of crops. They  also protected the peasant against 
the middleman: the Trier association fought over thirteen thousand legal actions against 
moneylenders and catde dealers between  1884 and 1918. F. Jacobs, Deutsche  Bauernfuhrer 
(Dusseldorf, 1958), p. 76. David  G.  Blackbourn  225 
positions  of  political  power  at  liberal  expense,  turned  to  announce  the 
bankruptcy  of  liberalism  as  an  economic,  political,  and  cultural  force. 
There  was  a striking  congruence  in  Social  Democratic  and  Center  at? 
tacks  on  German  capitalism  and  in  their  arguments  that  the  liberal 
middle  class  had  lost  its  "progressive"  role  and  forfeited  its  claim  to  be 
considered  a  "general  class."13 
The  two  parties  could  agree  only  in  their  diagnoses,  though,  not  in 
the  remedies  they  prescribed,  and  to  explain  this  requires  a  closer 
examination  of  the  kind  of  popular  support  which  made  each  a  mass 
party.  The  question  is relatively  straightforward  in  the  case  ofthe  Social 
Democrats,  who  were  squarely  based  on  the  industrial  working  class. 
The  Center,  by  contrast,  found  some  support  among  all  parts  of  the 
population,  from  Rhenish  businessmen  to  Westphalian  miners,  and 
from  Silesian  aristocrats  to  Bavarian  peasants.  The  fact  that  it  was  "a 
true  people's  party  which  embraces  all  Stande  and  classes"14  was  im? 
portant  to  the  leaders  ofthe  Center:  they  used  it  to  support  their  claim 
that  the  Center  alone  was  free  from  the  blinkered  class  and  sectional 
politics  of  the  other  parties,  whether  middle-class  National  Liberals, 
13. The  concept  ofa  "general" or "universal" class can be traced back to Hegel,  for 
whom  the bureaucracy embodied  the general interest of society  as a whole  (just as the 
state tended toward  the universal). The  sense of "general class" intended here is drawn 
from  Marx, who  rejected as illusory the Hegelian  claim for the universality of the bu? 
reaucracy (just as he rejected Hegel's view  ofthe  state). Rather, for Marx, different social 
classes, at particular times in history,  succeeded each other in representing the  general 
will  and potential of society. Marx, like the German Social Democrats,  believed that the 
bourgeoisie  had once  represented this "general" interest, but had become  the embodi- 
ment of partial class rule whose  claim to universality had been exploded.  It was the pro? 
letariat which now  inherited the mantle ofthe  "general class." See S. Avineri,  The Social 
and Political Thought  ofKarl Marx (Cambridge, 1970), chap. 2, pp. 41-64.  It is significant 
that the Social Democrats  in Wilhelmine  Germany  saw in the proletariat not  only  the 
general class whose triumph would  abolish (aufheben)  the contradictions between political 
power  and productive forces, between  the state and civil society, etc.: with  the supposed 
onset of  the decadent, declining  phase of bourgeois  liberalism, the proletariat also em? 
bodied  and subsumed the potential of all society in spheres such as culture. See G. Fiil- 
berth, Proletarische  Partei und burgerliche  Literatur  (Neuwied,  1972), p. 7. On  the  general 
problem ofthe  middle class as a general class, see A. Briggs, "Middle-Class Consciousness 
in English Politics,  1780-1846,"  Past and Present,  no. 9 (1956), pp. 65-74.  The ideologues 
of political Catholicism,  and Center politicians, could agree with  much ofthe  argument 
that the middle class had lost its former role: they saw the middle years ofthe  nineteenth 
century as a transitory phase of self-assured liberal bourgeois  ascendancy, arrogating to 
itself  (as, for example,  in  the matter of  laissez-faire economic  legislation)  the claim  to 
embody  a general interest. 
14. From the 1903 Reichstag election  program. L. Bergstrasser, Der politische Kathol- 
izismus: Dokumente  seiner Entwicklung,  2 vols.  (Munich,  1921-23),  2: 330. 226  Class  and  Politics  in  Wilhelmine  Germany 
agrarian  Conservatives,  or  working-class  Social  Democrats;  and  the 
existence  of  this  following  among  different  social  groups  has  been  re? 
marked  on  by  all  historians  who  have  dealt  with  the  party.15 
The  Center  did  not,  however,  draw  its  support  evenly  from  each  of 
these  groups.  German  Catholics  at  the  beginning  ofthe  twentieth  cen? 
tury  remained  significantly  underrepresented  in  the  great  urban  areas 
and  in  the  characteristic  occupations  of  an  industrial  society.  Indeed  the 
"economic  backwardness"  of  Catholic  communities  was  wielded  as  a 
confessional  weapon  by  the  strongly  anti-Catholic  Evangelical  League,16 
while  Center  politicians  like  the  future  historian  of  the  party,  Karl 
Bachem,  who  desperately  desired  that  German  Catholicism  should 
break  out  ofthe  ghetto  to  which  it  had  been  consigned  by  the  Kultur- 
kampf  recognized  the  realities  of  the  situation  when  they  called  for  a 
more  active  involvement  of  Catholics  in  industry  and  commerce.17 
The  fact  remained,  though,  that  in  1912  Catholics,  who  made  up  36.5 
percent  of  Germany's  total  population,  still  made  up  only  25.8  percent 
of  city  dwellers,18  and  were  much  more  heavily  represented  in  the 
ranks  of  peasants,  artisans,  and  shopkeepers  than  among  the  owners  of 
capital,  managers,  or  the  wage-  and  salary-earning  classes.19  This  was 
borne  out  by  the  areas  of  Center  support,  which  formed  a  backward 
fringe  to  the  south,  east,  and  west  ofthe  Reich.  The  party's  strongholds 
15- P. Molt,  Der Reichstag  vor der improvisierten  Revolution (Cologne-Opladen,  1963), 
describes the Center (p. 296) as a "people's party cutting across all classes and interests." 
For  similar judgments,  see Bergstrasser, Geschichte  der politischen  Parteien, p.  191;  G. 
Mann,  The History of Germany  since 1789 (London, 1968), p. 214; H.-U.  Wehler,  Das 
Deutsche  Kaiserreich  1871-1918, (Gottingen, 1973), PP- 83-84. 
16. J. Forberger, Die wirtschaftliche  und kulturelle  Ruckstandigkeit  der  Katholiken  und ihre 
Ursachen:  Flugschriften  des Evangelischen  Bundes,  Heft 263/4  (Leipzig, 1908). 
17. This was the crux ofa  strong speech made by Karl Bachem at the 1901 Annual 
Catholic  Assembly  (Katholikentag)  in  Osnabriick.  See  also Windthorst's  remarks to 
Adolf  Grober: "The Jews  nest happily  in  Catholic  areas, because  the  Catholics  are 
lazy; our clergy preach too much about the birds and flowers ofthe  field, which do not 
sow or reap, but yet receive the means to live. This reminds me of something our Bachem 
said: the  Catholic  financiers in  Cologne  have  no  spirit of  enterprise, otherwise  they 
would  long  since have had control  over the whole  trade of the Rhineland and West? 
phalia." H.  Cardauns, Adolf Grober  (M.-Gladbach,  1921),  p. 43.  Comparisons between 
the backwardness of  Catholics  and the  wealth  and drive  of  Germany's Jewish  com? 
munity were frequently made by Center politicians and publicists, often with overtones 
of resentment. 
18. That is, the population of Grossstadte  with over one hundred thousand inhabitants. 
19. F. Naumann,  Demokratie  und Kaisertum  (Berlin, 1904), p.  122; J. Rost, Die  ivirt- 
schaftliche  und kulturelle  Lage der deutschen  Katholiken (Cologne,  1911), pp.  9ff.;  M.  P. 
Fogarty,  Christian  Democracy  in Western  Europe, 1820-1953 (London, 1957), p. 304. David  G.  Blackbourn  227 
were  in  the  rural  areas:  the  Oberpfalz  district  of  Bavaria,  along  with 
Schwaben,  Oberbayern,  and  Niederbayern;  Oberschwaben,  the  least 
industrialized  part  of  Wurttemberg;  the  rural  areas  ofthe  Rhineland 
around  Trier,  Aachen,  and  Cologne;  the  nonindustrial  parts  of  the 
Breslau  and  Oppeln  areas  in  Silesia;  and  the  agricultural  Munsterland 
and  Sauerland  in  Westphalia.  Ofthe  113  Reichstag  seats  won  by  the 
Center  and  its  allies  in  1907,  78  were  in  constituencies  where  agriculture 
and  small  business  predominated.20 
At  a time  when  German  political  parties  were  increasingly  becoming 
the  vehicles  of  economic  interests,  Center  and  Social  Democrats  there? 
fore  found  themselves  bound  to  the  support  of  two  mutually  antago- 
nistic  groups  in  society:  the  Social  Democrats  to  the  dependent  working 
class  of  consumers;  the  Center  to  the  traditional  Mittelstand  of  inde? 
pendent  primary  producers,  petty  capitalists,  and  retailers.  The  Wil? 
helmine  Center  Party  was  particularly  susceptible  to  the  demands  of 
these  groups,  its  claims  to  stand  "above  interests"  notwithstanding. 
The  declining  impact  of  electoral  appeals  to  confessional  loyalty  has 
already  been  noted.  In  addition  to  this,  the  concentration  of  Center 
voters  in  safe  seats  (Stammsitzen)  was  double-edged  in  its  effects:  it  cut 
down  the  cost  of  fighting  elections,  but  in  the  absence  of  serious  politi? 
cal  opponents  it  stimulated  interest  groups  to  press  the  party  organiza? 
tion  for  special  policies,  and  even  special  candidates.  The  struggle 
waged  by  the  leadership  in  the  1890s  against  agrarian  interests  within 
the  Westphalian,  Rhenish,  and  Bavarian  party  organizations  demon? 
strated  the  power  of  such  groups;21  and  as the  leadership  was  hampered 
by  a  decentralized  party  structure  and  the  unreliability  of  an  eccen- 
trically  undisciplined  Center  press,  rebels  could  frequently  demand  a 
high  price  for  their  loyalty. 
The  impact  of  Mittelstand  pressure  on  the  Center  was  evident  on  a 
broad  range  of  issues,  but  especially  in  the  attitude  it  took  up  toward 
agricultural  protection;  and  in  this  sphere  the  party  necessarily  alienated 
the  Social  Democrats  (and  with  them,  the  Progressives),  for  whom 
20. H. Gabler, "Die Entwicklung  der Parteien auf landwirtschaftlicher Grundlage von 
1871-1912"  (Ph.D.  diss., University  of Berlin,  1934), p. 16, quoted in Gottwald,  p. 41. 
21. K. Bachem,  Vor  geschichte,  Geschichte  und Politik der  deutschen  Zentrumspartei,  9 vols. 
(Cologne,  1927-32),  5: 351-56;  Nipperdey,  p. 279; F. Jacobs, Von Schorlemer  zur Grunen 
Front (Dusseldorf, 1957), pp. 2176?.;  S. R. Tirrell, German  Agrarian  Politics after  Bismarck's 
Fall (New  York,  1951), pp. 120-23,  212-24,  225, 245, 294; K. Miiller,  "Zentrumspartei 
und  agrarische Bewegung  im  Rheinland,  1882-1903,"  in K.  Repgen  and S.  Skalweit, 
eds., Spiegel der Geschichte:  Festgabefiir M. Braubach  zum 10. April 1964 (Miinster, 1964). 228  Class  and  Politics  in  Wilhelmine  Germany 
"cheap  bread"  was  a major  demand.  In  the  early  years  ofthe  1890s,  the 
Center  leader  Ernst  Lieber  was  almost  driven  out  of  public  life,  and  the 
existence  ofthe  party  itself  threatened,  by  agrarian  opposition  to  official 
Center  support  for  Caprivi's  trade  treaties,  which  lowered  the  tariff 
protection  afforded  to  primary  producers.22  The  lesson  was  not  lost  on 
the  leadership.  In  subsequent  years  the  Center  played  a  leading  role  in 
the  passage  of  legislation  which  protected  dairy  producers  against  the 
competition  of  margarine,  cattle  breeders  against  imported  meat  and 
animals,  and  all  primary  producers  against  foreign  competition,  by 
means  ofthe  very  high  Biilow  tariff  of  1902.  When,  in  1902,  the  Social 
Democrats  attempted  to  block  the  passage  of  this  measure  by  filibuster- 
ing,  the  Center  stood  firm  alongside  the  agrarian  Conservatives  to 
secure  the  tariff,  and  it  was  the  Center  deputy  Adolf  Grober  who  was 
responsible  for  drafting  new  standing  orders  for  the  Reichstag  to  pre? 
vent  a repetition  of  these  Social  Democratic  tactics.23  But  even  on  sub? 
jects  where  Center  and  Social  Democrats  were  in  broad  agreement,  the 
former  tried  to  tailor  the  small  print  of  legislation  to  the  interests  of  its 
peasant  and  small-business  supporters.  Thus,  in  supporting  improved 
factory  acts  and  provision  for  the  unemployed,  it  hoped  to  turn  this 
legislation  to  the  advantage  ofthe  Mittelstand:  only  large  factories,  not 
small  workshops,  were  to  be  made  subject  to  inspection,  giving  the 
artisan  producer  an  advantage  over  the  large  capitalist;  and  the  nascent 
employment  exchanges  were  to  be  encouraged  to  divert  labor  back  to 
the  land.24  In  its  economic  and  social  policies  generally  the  Center 
favored  state  intervention  sufficient  to  subsidize  the  independence  ofthe 
Mittelstand,  without  expenditure  in  fields  like  education  and  welfare  on 
a  scale  great  enough  to  harm  lower-middle-class  taxpayers. 
22. Gottwald  (pp. 151-52)  quotes a letter from Lieber to Heinrich Otto,  chairman of 
the Augustinus-Verein  (the association of Center newspapers), complaining of misrepre- 
sentation and even ofa  "war of extermination" (Vernichtungskrieg)  being fought against 
him,  and threatening to leave public life completely.  Lieber also wrote  to the Bavarian 
Center leader, Schaedler, at this time, deploring the division of the party into economic 
interest groups, and claiming that this tearing apart of the Center was more advanced 
than at any  time  since the Kulturkampf.  Lieber to  Schaedler, June 6,  1894, Pfalzische 
LandesbibKothek, Speyer, Ernst Lieber Nachlass, S.32. 
23. K.  Bachem,  6:  163-65;  Cardauns, p.  112. The  National  Liberals, however,  ini- 
tially supporters of the Center move,  later refused to accept a revision of the standing 
orders. 
24.  Verhandlungen  der Wiirttembergischen  Kammer  der Abgeordneten  auf dem  33 Landtag: 
Protokoll  Band II, p. 1174,  55 Sitzung,  June 28, i8g$ (henceforth: 33 LT, PB II, p. 1174,  55 
S., June 28, i8gs);  Politische Zeitfragen  in  Wurttemberg:  Zwanglos erscheinende  Hefte 17 
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From  the  early  1890s  Mttfetowc/aspirations  were  firmly  incorporated 
into  Center  Party  policy.  This  had  a  crucial  bearing  on  the  Center's 
relations  with  the  Social  Democrats,  for  it  occurred  at  the  same  time  as 
?although  cutting  across  in  its  effects?another  important  change  in 
the  Center.  At  the  political  level  there  was  a leftward  shift  in  the  Center 
from  the  early  1890s,  marked  by  Ernest  Lieber's  succession  to  Wind- 
thorst  as  party  leader,  against  the  rival  claim  of  Franz  Ballestrem, 
leader  ofthe  conservative  wing  ofthe  party  which  supported  Caprivi's 
1893  Military  Bill.  From  the  1893  Reichstag  election  the  conservative 
aristocrats  in  the  Center  declined  sharply  in  numbers  and  influence,  to 
be  replaced  by  men  who,  on  political  issues,  stood  closer  to  the  Social 
Democrats,  defending  unequivocally  the  ballot  box  and  the  powers  of 
the  Reichstag  against  threats  to  the  constitution  from  the  right.  If  in 
Prussia  the  Center  continued  to  resist  reform  of  the  reactionary  three- 
class  franchise,  there  were  Center  leaders  from  southern  and  western 
states  who  not  only  called  themselves  "democrats,"  but  also  joined  the 
left  in  attacking  the  tax  burden  imposed  by  army  and  navy  expendi- 
ture.25  Yet,  on  the  crucial  matters  of  economic  and  social  policy  these 
leaders  too  remained  fiercely  at  odds  with  the  Social  Democrats.  When 
contemporaries  spoke  of  a  south  German  left  wing  emerging  in  the 
Center  Party  before  1914,  represented  by  men  such  as  Heim  and 
Schaedler  in  Bavaria,  Grober  and  Erzberger  in  Wurttemberg,  Fehren- 
bach  and  Schiiler  in  Baden,26  they  were  actually  observing  the  growing 
weight  within  the  party  of  a  strain  of  ipro-Mittelstand  radicalism  as 
antipathetic  to  the  working  class  and  Social  Democrats  as  the  rigid 
conservatism  of  more  right-wing  leaders  like  Ballestrem,  Porsch,  and 
25. On  the  "inner democratization"  ofthe  Center,  see K.  Buchheim,  Geschichte  der 
christHchen  Parteien  in Deutschland  (Munich, 1953), p. 221; Morsey, p. 48; Nipperdey,  pp. 
28off.  On  the  south  and west  German  opposition  in  the  Center  to  the  1893 bill,  K. 
Bachem,  5: 278; Gottwald,  pp. i22ff;  and on opposition  to the navy, E. Kehr, Schlacht? 
flottenbau und Parteipolitik  i8g4~igoi:  Versuch  eines Querschnitts  durch  die innenpolitischen, 
sozialen und ideologischen  Voraussetzungen  des deutschen  Imperialismus  (Berlin,  1930),  pp. 
43-50,  194-98;  K. Bachem,  5: 473-74,  479-80. 
26. For  an account  of  the  left  wing  within  the  party,  especially  at the  time  of  the 
Center's disagreement with  the government  over  colonial  estimates in 1907, see G. D. 
Crothers,  The German Elections of igo7  (New  York,  1941),  and K.  Epstein,  Matthias 
Erzberger  and  the  Dilemma of German  Democracy  (Princeton, 1959)- After the 1912 elections 
to  the  Reichstag,  the  extreme  Conservative  Roesicke  wrote  to  von  Bocklin  (June 2, 
1912), expressing his concern that the influence of men like Grober (who leaned "strongly 
to the left") was growing,  as a result ofthe  frequent absences from Berlin ofthe  conserva? 
tive Center leader Hertling,  who  was prime minister in Bavaria, and the ineffectiveness 
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Peter  Spahn.  In  these  southern  and  southwestern  states,  where  Center 
left  and  Social  Democratic  revisionist  right  might  have  been  expected 
to  meet  on  common  ground,  there  was  in  fact  little  political  coopera? 
tion  prior  to  1914.  The  situation  in  Baden,  where  a Social  Democratic- 
National  Liberal  Bloc  was  pitted  against  a  Conservative-Center  right, 
became  instead  the  model  for  politics  in  the  south,  and  indeed  for  the 
Reich  as  a  whole.27 
11 
An  examination  of  Center  interest  groups  and  economic  and  social 
policies  in  Wurttemberg  provides  an  opportunity  to  look  more  closely 
at  how  these  affected  the  party's  attitude  toward  the  Social  Democrats. 
Wurttemberg  was  in  some  respects  a state  known  for  its  distinct  politi? 
cal  traditions.  Celebrated  before  the  nineteenth  century  for  its  advanced 
representative  institutions,  it  enjoyed  in  the  fifty  years  prior  to  1914  the 
enlightened  reign  of  two  monarchs,  Karl  I and  Wilhelm  II,  who  were 
content  to  leave  policy  and  politics  to  their  ministers  acting  together 
with  party  leaders.28  There  was  also  a  long-standing  popular  demo? 
cratic  tradition  in  the  state,  which  expressed  itself  powerfully  in  1848. 
To  the  extent  that  this  "anti-governmental"  democratic  tradition  per- 
sisted  into  the  second  half  ofthe  nineteenth  century,  Wurttemberg  was 
late  in  developing  a  party  system  based  on  class  lines.  This,  however, 
was  a  feature  it  had  in  common  with  other  south  German  states  like 
Bavaria  and  Baden. 
In  other  respects,  too,  Wurttemberg  has  claims  to  be  considered  rep? 
resentative  for  a case  study  of  Center-Social  Democrat  relations.  It was 
one  of  the  south  German  states  where  the  two  conflicting  develop? 
ments  which  we  have  noted  within  the  Center  from  the  1890s?a  shift 
to  the  left  politically,  but  a hardening  pro-Mittelstand  position  on  socio- 
27. Heckart, pp. 9ifE; Rosenberg,  pp. 48-49;  K. Bachem,  8:  i45f?  In both  Baden 
and Bavaria the Social Democrats and Center combined over electoral reforms designed 
to "dish the liberals," the Center gaining in the countryside and the Social Democrats in 
the towns.  But their cooperation did not extend to other issues, and throughout  south 
Germany the Social Democrats found they still had most in common  with the National 
Liberals  and Progressives on educational and cultural matters, as on social and economic 
issues. See H. Schlemmer, "Die Rolle der Sozialdemokratie in den Landtagen Badens und 
Wurttembergs  und ihr Einfluss auf die Entwicklung  der Gesamtpartei zwischen  1890 
und 1914," (Ph.D.  diss., University  of Freiburg, 1953). 
28. On the special features of Wurttemberg,  see H. Haering, "Wiirttemberg  und das 
Reich in der Geschichte," Zeitschrift  fiir wurttembergische  Landesgeschichte  7  (1943): 294- 
322; K. Simon, Die wiirttembergischen  Demokraten  (Stuttgart, 1969), pp. 5-12,  48-49. David  G.  Blackbourn  231 
economic  issues?were  very  clear.  This  was  personified  in  the  attitude 
of  the  two  most  important  national  leaders  which  the  Center  party  in 
the  state  produced,  Adolf  Grober  and  Matthias  Erzberger.  Wiirttem? 
berg  was,  at  the  same  time,  the  only  one  of  these  south  German  states 
where  Catholics,  as in  the  Reich  as a whole,  made  up  a minority  of  one- 
third.  Finally,  in  the  electoral  pattern  which  emerged  in  the  state,  of 
Center  strength  in  the  small  towns  and  villages,  Social  Democrat  sup? 
port  in  the  industrial  towns,  Wurttemberg  was  again  representative  of 
German  conditions  generally. 
The  parliamentary  fortunes  ofthe  two  parties  ran  parallel  courses  in 
Wurttemberg.  Both  won  their  first  Landtag  seats  in  1895,  and  con? 
tinued  in  subsequent  elections  to  increase  their  representation  at  Na? 
tional  Liberal  and  Progressive  expense.  In  1895  the  Center  had  eighteen 
and  the  Social  Democrats  two  of  the  seventy  elected  members  of  the 
Landtag;  by  1912  the  Center  had  twenty-six  and  the  Social  Democrats 
seventeen  members  of  an  enlarged  and  all-elected  Landtag.  But  they 
made  inroads  into  entirely  different  areas  of  former  National  Liberal 
and  Progressive  support.  The  Social  Democrats  gained  in  urban  work? 
ing-class  centers  like  Stuttgart,  Cannstatt,  Esslingen,  Geislingen,  Gop- 
pingen,  and  Heilbronn;  despite  attempts  to  appeal  to  the  rural  voter  the 
party  could  make  little  headway  in  such  areas.  The  Center  inherited 
former  Progressive  voters  from  among  the  peasantry  and  small-business 
class  ofthe  outlying  agricultural  regions,  especially  in  the  extreme  south 
ofthe  state.  Its weakness  in  the  towns  matched  that  ofthe  Social  Demo? 
crats  in  the  countryside.  While  the  ranks  of  Social  Democratic  deputies 
in  the  Landtag  were  filled  with  party  functionaries,  trade  union  and 
cooperative  officials,  the  composition  ofthe  Center  group  in  the  Land? 
tag  gave  a clear  indication  of  its  Mittelstand  pedigree. 
Forty-five  deputies  represented  the  party  in  the  Landtag  between 
1895  and  the  war.  Eleven  were  government  officials,  who  provided 
most  of  the  party's  leadership  at  state  level  and  in  the  Landtag  itself; 
seven  belonged  to  the  professional  middle  class  (three  teachers,  two 
lawyers,  two  editors);  and  more  than  half  directly  or  indirectly  repre? 
sented  the  interests  of  the  Mittelstand,  Nine  were  small-town  mayors, 
often?like  Johannes  Sommer  (Saulgau)  and  Georg  Maier  (Rottweil)? 
themselves  artisans  or  smallholders;  a total  of  five  were  tavern  keepers 
small  businessmen,  or  artisans;  six  were  peasants;  and  four  were  priests, 
who  belonged  by  birth  and  upbringing  to  the  rural  lower  middle  class, 
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state's  Christian  Peasant  Association  (Christlicher  Bauernverein).  Only 
three  out  of  forty-five  were  identified  with  the  interests  of  large  capital 
or  organized  labor:  two  secretaries  of  workers'  associations,  elected 
from  the  "List"  not  directly  in  constituencies;  and  one  factory  owner, 
elected  against  an  official  Center  candidate  and  retrospectively  accepted 
into  the  parliamentary  group.29  At  the  local  level  the  mittelstdndisch 
character  ofthe  party  was  even  more  pronounced:  at Waldsee  the  nine- 
man  delegation  to  the  party's  central  state  committee  consisted  of  two 
priests,  a teacher,  a tavern  keeper,  a master  shoemaker,  a painter,  a small 
businessman,  and  two  peasants.30 
The  aim  which  these  interests  had  in  common  was  to  modify  the 
workings  of  the  free-for-all  economic  system,  in  order  to  safeguard 
their  own  independent  livelihoods.  Agricultural  producers  wanted  to 
resist  being  pushed  into  impoverished  impotence  within  a  powerful 
Industriestaat;  artisans  called  for  discriminatory  legislation  against  large 
concerns,  which  monopolized  raw  materials  and,  through  economies  of 
scale,  enjoyed  an  inbuilt  advantage  over  the  small  producer;  and  re? 
tailers  wanted  tighter  controls  over  the  new  leviathan  department  and 
chain  stores,  together  with  their  auxiliary  services  of  traveling  salesmen, 
advertising,  special  offers,  and  motorized  delivery.  These  groups  had 
begun  to  turn  away  from  the  "Manchester  men"  ofthe  Progressives 
when  it  became  clear  that  this  party  had  little  sympathy  with  the  griev? 
ances  ofthe  Mittelstand.  They  were  no  less  hostile  to  the  Social  Demo? 
crats  and  the  organized  working  class,  whose  consumer  cooperatives 
pulled  down  prices,  whose  trade  unions  pushed  up  costs,  and  whose 
very  existence  threatened  members  ofthe  Mittelstand  with  the  prospect 
of  losing  their  own  independent  status.  The  deftness  with  which  the 
Center  Party  appealed  to  the  apprehensions  and  discontents  of  these 
groups  had  played  a large  part  in  creating  a popular  base  for  the  party 
29. Compiled from the Mitgliederverzeichnis  for the seven parliaments  meeting between 
1895 and the war, as contained in 35 LT, BB  (Beilage-Band)  III, pp. 1-4; 33 LT,  BB IV, 
pp. 419-24; 33 LT, BB IX, pp. 117-19;  34 LT, BB II, pp. 303-306; 34 LT, BB III, pp. 1009- 
12; 35 LT, BB II, pp. 795a 36LT,  BB IV, pp. 455-64; 37 LT, BB II, pp. 217ft'.;  37LT,  BB 
V,pp. 627ff.;38LT, BBIV,pp.  181-84;38LT,  BBIII,pp.329-55;39LT,  BBII,pp.  235-42. 
Further details from  the Hauptregister  iiber die Verhandlungen  der Stdnde des Konigreichs 
Wiirttemberg  und der Landtage  von 1856 bis 1906. Center deputies elected at by-elections 
were  traced in the Literarische  Beilage des Staats-Anzeigers  fiir  Wurttemberg  (Chronik  des 
fahres), where by-election  details are given at the end of each annual volume. 
30.  Waldse'er  Wochenblatt,  May  5, 1895. David  G.  Blackbourn  233 
in  Wurttemberg  before  1895:31  after  that  date  Center  leaders  had  the 
problem  of  assimilating  and  orchestrating  the  pressures  which  these 
voters  continued  to  exert. 
The  peasantry  was  a  special  problem,  as  rising  costs,  falling  prices, 
and  the  unpopular  trade  treaties  combined  to  heighten  rural  discontent 
in  the  1890s.  Center  leaders  were  particularly  nervous  about  develop? 
ments  like  those  in  neighboring  Bavaria,  where  the  Bayerischer  Bauern- 
bund  had  been  formed  in  1893  as  a radical  agrarian  party,  drawing  sup? 
port  from  customary  Center  voters.  In  Bavaria  the  effect  was  to  drive 
the  local  Center  Party  further  toward  the  agrarian  position,  and  almost 
to  the  point  of  secession  from  the  national  party.32  In  Wurttemberg  the 
impact  of  pressure  from  agricultural  constituencies  was  similar,  if  less 
dramatic.  From  the  outset  party  leaders  faced  a  strong  agrarian  wing 
within  the  parliamentary  group,  led  by  deputies  like  Theophil  Egger 
(Ravensburg),  Franz  Xaver  Krug  (Biberach),  and  Johannes  Sommer. 
There  was  a  similar  tension  in  the  party  press,  between  the  Deutsches 
Volksblatt  in  Stuttgart,  which  stood  close  to  the  Center  leadership,  and 
less  staid  small-town  papers,  such  as  the  Ipf-Zeitung,  whose  sympathies 
were  with  the  small  man  on  the  land  and  his  supporters  on  the  Center 
back  benches.  In  1897  back  bench  impatience  over  the  state  of  agricul? 
ture  led  to  a  revolt  in  the  Center  Party  over  tax  reform  legislation. 
Agrarian  pressure  had  forced  an  all-party  compromise  in  the  Landtag 
committee  dealing  with  tax  reform,  which  offered  substantial  conces? 
sions  to  agriculture  and  the  Mittelstand  in  the  levying  of  the  recast 
Gewerbesteuer33  But  this  package,  when  recommended  to  the  Center 
group  in  the  Landtag  by  Viktor  Rembold  on  behalf  ofthe  party  leader? 
ship,  was  rejected:  for  many  deputies  from  agricultural  constituencies 
the  concessions  did  not  go  far  enough.  An  embarrassed  Rembold  was 
31. For a more detailed account, see my article, "The Political Alignment  ofthe  Centre 
Party in Wilhelmine  Germany: A Study ofthe  Party's Emergence in Nineteenth-century 
Wurttemberg,"  Historical  Journal 18 (1975): 821-50. 
32. K. Bachem,  5: 294-95;  Nipperdey,  p. 288. On the hostile temper of peasant opin? 
ion generally in Bavaria, K. Mockl,  Die Prinzregentenzeit:  Gesellschaft  und  Politik wdhrend 
der Ara des Prinzregenten  Luitpold in Bayern (Munich,  1972), pp. 454ff. 
33. With  the introduction  of income  tax, the former method  of taxing the yield from 
business now  involved  an element of "double taxation" on personal earnings from busi? 
ness concerns. The temporary solution found by  the Landtag committee  was to reduce 
(by a percentage proportionate  to the size of turnover) the scale of liability  (Kataster)  to 
tax on businesses (Gewerbesteuer).  Agriculture  then demanded reductions in the scale of 
liabilities to tax on land (Grundkataster),  their argument based on the falling income  from 
land rather than "double taxation." 234  Class  and  Politics  in  Wilhelmine  Germany 
forced  to  admit  in  the  Landtag  that  the  Center  leadership  could  not 
carry  the  party  with  it.  Only  after  further  concessions  had  been  wrung 
by  Center  leaders  in  committee  could  the  deadlock  be  broken  and  the 
support  of  back  bench  agrarians  once  more  be  relied  upon.34 
The  initial  response  of  the  leadership  to  this  embarrassment,  and  to 
further  rumblings  within  the  party  as  the  time  for  the  renewal  of 
Caprivi's  trade  treaties  approached,  was  to  fall  back  on  the  traditional 
claim  that  the  Center  must  be  a  party  of  all  classes  and  Stdnde,  and  to 
warn  potential  rebels  against  agrarian  blandishments,  especially  those  of 
the  Bauernbund  (founded  in  Wurttemberg  in  1893  as the  local  organiza? 
tion  of  the  Prussian  Junker-dominated  Bund  der  Landwirte).  Grober, 
addressing  the  parliamentary  group  on  the  eve  of  the  January  1901 
election  campaign,  drew  attention  pointedly  to  the  dangers  of  sectional 
selfishness  within  the  party;35  and  the  care  taken  over  the  choice  of 
candidates  revealed  the  determination  of  the  leadership  to  stamp  out 
incipient  interest  groups,  and  select  instead  men  who  stood  "above  the 
interests."36 
However,  the  mailed  fist  policy  proved  an  even  greater  embarrass? 
ment  to  Center  leaders.  In Ravensburg  they  failed  to  have  removed  as a 
candidate  the  stubborn  octogenarian  Egger,  a  focus  of  agrarian  dis? 
content,  while  in  five  other  constituencies  unofficial  candidates  were  up 
against  official  Center  men,  in  three  cases  winning  the  seat.  This  serious 
reverse  for  the  leadership  cannot,  of  course,  be  ascribed  simply  to  the 
current  of  agrarian  feeling.  In  all  the  constituencies  which  revolted 
there  was  a  general  feeling  of  opposition  among  Center  voters  in  the 
small  towns  against  high-handed  leadership  as such.37  Another  motif  of 
34- 33 LT, PB VI, 174 S., Dec. 15,1897; 175 S., Dec. 16,1897; 179 S., Dec. 22,1897. 
35. Speech  by  Grober  at  the  Europaischer Hof  hotel,  Stuttgart,  reported  in  the 
Gmiinder  Tagblatt,  Nov.  11, 1900. 
36. In Leutkirch, the local election committee picked Nikolaus Braunger as its candi? 
date rather than the sitting deputy Ferdinand Eggmann, the former having been recom- 
mended by Grober in a letter which spoke of his disinterested  talents as a potential mem? 
ber of parliamentary committees  (Schwdbische  Kronik,  Nov.  7, 1900). In Gmiind, where 
internal squabbles had characterized the party in the  1890s, the leadership disregarded 
the claims of both likely local men and settled on an outsider of proven reliability, the 
Ravensburg lawyer Alfred Rembold, whose brother Viktor was already Landtag deputy 
for  Schwabisch-Hall, and who  was himself  an important figure in  the Wurttemberg 
party, and a member of the Reichstag. 
37. In Leutkirch Eggmann was put up against Braunger, and a meeting at Wurzach, 
attended by over two hundred people, resolved "under no circumstances" to support the 
leadership's choice. A local man, Eduard Kuen, was put up by constituents in Wangen, 
and forced the "outsider," member ofthe  Reichstag Theodor Hofmann, to stand down David  G.  Blackbourn  23  5 
discontent  was  the  dissatisfaction  which  isolated  communities  felt  over 
the  inability  of  the  Center  to  fulfil  its  promises  to  accelerate  railway 
branch  line  construction:  the  party  had  courted  the  rural  Mittelstand 
vote  by  attacking  Progressive  indifference  and  government  neglect  in 
this  sphere,  and  certainly  in  the  constituencies  of  Gmiind  and  Tettnang, 
disillusion  at  subsequent  Center  policy  seems  to  have  played  an  im? 
portant  part  in  the  events  of  1901.38  The  branch  line  issue  itself  was, 
however,  to  a  large  extent  an  agrarian  issue.  Voters  in  agricultural 
areas  felt  a  sense  of  neglect  by  urban  administrators  and  legislators 
whom  they  regarded  as  acting  in  the  interests  of  large  capital:  discrim- 
ination  against  outlying  rural  areas  in  the  provision  of  communications 
was  seen  as  one  aspect  of  this  neglect.  The  agrarian  Bund  der Landwirte, 
for  example,  consistently  called  on  governments  to  build  branch  lines 
rather  than  main  lines  and  canals.  The  discontent  displayed  in  Gmiind 
and  Tettnang  over  the  failure  of  local  railway  projects  must  therefore 
be  seen  within  a  broader  framework  of  rural  or  small-town  animus. 
In  addition  other,  more  specifically  agrarian  grievances  were  promi- 
nent  in  1901.  The  strength  of  local  feeling  on  the  tariff,  rural  labor 
shortage,  and  other  issues  was  illustrated  in  Gmiind,  where  a  Bauern- 
bund  candidate,  Joseph  Rupp,  polled  several  hundred  votes  in  Center 
village  strongholds,39  while  in  Horb  a  smallholder,  Franz  Kessler,  beat 
as official candidate.  In troubled  Gmiind  the  candidacy  of  Anton  Klaus  (the former 
deputy)  was announced against Rembold:  "As there is in our district, in truth, no lack of 
fitting  and capable persons, we  shall under no  circumstances give  our votes  to  anyone 
other than a resident of the district. . . . We  oppose  categorically  the slogan circulated 
here, that Gmiind must of necessity send off another lawyer to the Landtag, just to pro? 
vide  it with  another committee  man."  If this trend became  general, it was argued, the 
Landtag would  degenerate into  a "domain  of the lawyers,  from  which  may  God  pre? 
serve us." Heuberger  Bote, Nov.  17,  1900; Nov.  20,  1900; Nov.  21,  1900; Ipf-Zeitung, 
Nov.  14, 1900; Gmunder  Tagblatt,  Nov.  24, 1900. 
38. The  rebel group  in  Gmiind  contrasted the progress achieved by  a railway-con- 
scious  deputy  in  Pforzheim  (on  the  border  between  Baden  and Wurttemberg)  with 
what they might expect from an outsider in Gmiind, with  a lawyer's practice in Ravens- 
burg and political  commitments  in Berlin.  Gmunder Tagblatt,  Nov.  28,  1900. On  Tett- 
nang,  see Schwdbische  Kronik, Nov.  4,  1900.  At  the  1913 by-election  in Rottweil,  the 
Progressives tried to make political capital, in turn, out ofthe  Center neglect  of branch 
lines. See the  Volkspartei  pamphlet  "Wahlaufruf an die Wahler von  Rottweil,"  where a 
"respected citizen" is reported as saying "we  are fed up being  led around by  the nose 
over  our railway by the Rottweil  Center party." Copy  in the Hauptstaatsarchiv Stutt? 
gart, Nachlass Conrad Haussmann, Q  1/2,  104. 
39. The  candidate, Joseph  Rupp,  was  sufficiently popular  locally  to  win  a place in 
early  1902 on the committee  of  the  Gmiind  Landwirtschaftlicher  Bezirksverein. Report 236  Class  and  Politics  in  Wilhelmine  Germany 
the  official  Center  candidate  on  an  extreme  agrarian  program  and  had 
to  be  accepted  into  the  party's  parliamentary  group.40  It  was  indicated 
too  by  the  success  ofa  number  of  official  Center  candidates  like  Krug, 
Sommer,  and  Joseph  Dambacher  (Ellwangen),  who  were  demanding 
firmer  measures  in  the  defense  of  primary  producers,  including  in  some 
cases  tariffs  even  higher  than  those  called  for  by  the  Bauernbund. 
The  shock  administered  to  the  leadership  in  1901  had  its  effect.  The 
party  strengthened  its  links  with  agricultural  constituents  through  the 
Bauernvereine:  Anton  Keilbach's  entry  into  the  Landtag  after  a  1904 
by-election  in  Waldsee  was  one  indication  of  this.  The  Center  also 
stepped  up  the  demands  it  made  at  state  level  on  behalf  of  agriculture, 
while  the  Deutsches  Volksblatt  became  notably  more  sympathetic  to  the 
agrarian  cause.  The  guarding  of  the  party's  agrarian  flank  against  the 
Bauernbund  was  most  evident  in  the  Landtag  debates  of  1901  over  the 
Biilow  tariffs.  In  the  last  years  ofthe  1890s  the  Center  in  Wurttemberg 
had  still  been  attacking  the  Bauernbund  for  the  one-sidedness  of  its 
demands:  now  it  stole  the  agrarians'  clothes,  as  it  took  the  initiative  in 
asking  the  state's  representatives  in  the  Bundesrat  to  press  for  higher 
tariffs.  One  commentator,  noting  the  wholesale  appropriation  by  the 
Center  of  the  agrarian  program,  remarked  of  the  debates  that  by  the 
time  Bauernbund  deputies  were  able  to  speak,  "they  were,  with  the  best 
will  in  the  world,  unable  to  present  any  new  points  of  view,  let  alone 
demands  of  their  own."41 
Despite  competition  between  the  two  parties  for  the  peasant  vote, 
Center  and  Bauernbund  Conservatives  were  drawn  together  politically 
by  the  similarity  of  their  policies  after  about  1900.  On  educational  re? 
form,  for  example,  they  united  against  Progressives  and  Social  Demo? 
crats,  opposing  not  only  the  anticlerical  tenor  of  reform  plans,  but  also 
the  proposal  to  raise  the  school-leaving  age,  which  would  have  de- 
prived  agriculture  of  some  of  its  badly  needed  supply  of  free  family 
labor.  Electoral  agreements  in  by-elections  at  Miinsingen  (1903)  and 
Mergentheim  (1904)  were  the  first  steps  toward  the  formal  political 
ofthe  association's annual general meeting of Feb. 9,1902,  in Gmunder  Tagblatt,  Feb. 11, 
1902. 
40. On  the campaign see Schwdbische  Kronik, Nov.  24,1900,  and Gmunder  Tagblatt, 
Nov.  16, 1900; and also the Beobachter,  Nov.  11, 1901, and Deutsches  Volksblatt,  Jan. 14, 
1901, and Jan. 21, 1901. 
41.  Tdgliche  Rundschau  (Berlin), Feb. 4, 1901, quoted in Deutsches Volksblatt,  Feb. 12, 
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alliance  ofthe  1912  Schwarz-Blau-Block.42  As  the  Center  embraced  the 
agrarian  Conservatives,  its  relations  with  the  Social  Democrats  steadily 
worsened.  In  the  1890s  they  retained  areas  of  agreement,  like  support 
for  income  tax  and  antimilitarism;  but  the  reemergence  at  the  turn  of 
the  century  of  the  conflict  between  primary  producers  and  working- 
class  consumers  henceforth  overshadowed  all  other  matters  on  which 
Center  and  Social  Democrats  might  have  agreed.  The  Wurttemberg 
tariff  debates  of  1901,  like  those  in  the  Reichstag,  created  a  bitterness 
between  the  two  parties  which  survived  until  the  war.  Even  in  the  ex- 
ceptional  circumstances  of  1907,  when  they  were  branded  together  as 
Reichsfeinde  in  opposition  to  Biilow's  Conservative-National  Liberal- 
Progressive  Bloc,  the  issue  of  "dear  bread"  was  enough  to  prevent  any 
alliance  at  the  polls.43 
in 
While  pressure  on  the  Center  from  agricultural  interests  has  been  most 
commonly  noted  by  historians,  the  party's  relations  with  other  parts  of 
the  Mittelstand  were  equally  telling,  and  important  in  driving  a wedge 
between  it  and  the  Social  Democrats.  One  such  group  was  made  up  by 
craftsmen  and  small  businessmen,  many  of  whom  like  primary  pro? 
ducers  feared  loss  of  livelihood  and  independent  status  as  a  result  of 
rapid,  uncontrolled  industrialization.  Apprehensions  in  the  business 
Mittelstand  heightened  in  the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century,  as 
42. Both  of  these were  agricultural constituencies.  In Munsingen  the agrarian Con? 
servatives  (Bauernbund)  supported  the  Center  candidate,  the  tavern  keeper  Schmitt, 
against the Progressives, who  had to field an "agrarian" candidate of their own, Reihling, 
and play the anticlerical card, to win.  In Mergentheim  the Center paid off its debt by 
helping  the  Bauerbund  candidate,  Valentin  Mittnacht,  to  victory  over  the  Progressive 
candidate, Keller. See Politische  Zeitfragen,  12 (Stuttgart, 1906), pp. 633-39.  The National 
Liberals (who  shared the candidate Keller with  the Progressives in Mergentheim)  tried 
to win  the Bauernbund  away from the pro-Center  alliance, and offered a joint  candidate. 
The Bauernbund  secretary, Schrempf, refused outright. See the correspondence, printed in 
Schwabische  Kronik, Nov.  12, 1904. 
43. In the Wurttemberg  constituency  III (Heilbronn),  for example,  Center and Con? 
servative  agrarians fought  together  against Progressives, National  Liberals, and  Social 
Democrats.  K. Jakob, "Landtagswahlen und Reichstagswahlen  in Wurttemberg,"  Stid- 
deutsche  Monatshefte  4  (1907):  5i7ff.;  G.  Kittler,  Aus  dem dritten wurttemb. Reichstags- 
Wahlkreis: Erinnerungen  und Erlebnisse (Heilbronn,  1910), pp.  142-43;  Th.  Heuss, Erin? 
nerungen  1905-1933 (Tiibingen,  1963), pp. 59-64.  In 1908, while  the Bloc  still existed, the 
major  political  alignment  remained?as  in  Baden?a  Conservative/Center  agrarian 
right against a Social Democrat/Progressive/National  Liberal left. See, for example,  the 
lineup  in  the  municipal  elections  in  Stuttgart  and  Neckarsulm,  Deutsches Volksblatt, 
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the  liberal  economic  codes  ofthe  unified  Reich,  together  with  the  fillip 
given  to  large-scale  industrial  expansion  by  a larger  market,  presented 
them  with  serious  competition.  By  1890  new  industrial  processes  and 
changing  patterns  of  consumption  had  already  gravely  undermined 
groups  of  craftsmen  like  coopers,  tanners,  and  nailmakers;  and  small 
producers  in  major  branches  such  as  construction,  metalworking,  and 
food  and  drink  were  now  concerned  at  the  disadvantages  in  acquiring 
capital,  labor,  raw  materials,  and  outlets  which  they  faced  when  com- 
peting  with  larger  concerns.44 
In  Wurttemberg  small  businesses  had  been  struggling  against  factory 
competition  and  the  decline  of  traditional  corporate  controls  since  the 
first  half  of  the  century.  Nearly  six  thousand  artisans'  businesses  were 
subject  to  forced  sales  in  the  eight  years  after  1840,45  and  the  National 
Artisan  Congress  at  Frankfurt  in  1848  received  countless  petitions  from 
the  state  calling  for  the  abolition  of  liberal  industrial  codes  which  sup? 
posedly  discriminated  against  the  Mittelstand  producer.  One  from  Tutt- 
lingen,  for  example,  praised  the  old  guild  system  and  protested  em- 
phatically  against  "the  trade  freedom  (Gewerbefreiheit),  which  is  non- 
sensical  in  our  situation,  but  which  so  many  progressive  men  profess."46 
As  in  the  Reich  generally,  the  more  rapidly  proceeding  industrialization 
which  occurred  after  mid-century  aggravated  the  situation.  In  Wiirt? 
temberg,  a  state  with  strong  craft  traditions,  a number  of  notable  men 
succeeded  in  coming  to  terms  with  the  new  circumstances:  Gottfried 
Daimler,  who  began  his  career  as  a  simple  gunsmith;  Ernst  Junghans, 
a master  watchmaker  whose  entrepreneurial  talents  secured  him  world- 
wide  markets  for  an  expanded  business;  and  Karl  Voigt,  whose  lock- 
smith's  workshop  grew  to  the  point  where  it  was  capable  of  supplying 
Niagara  Falls  with  its  turbine  engines.47  But  such  men  remained  ex- 
44-J. Wernicke, Kapitalismus  und  Mittelstandspolitik  (Jena, 1922), pp. 143-47; A. Noll, 
"Wirtschaftliche und  soziale Entwicklung  des Handwerks  in  der zweiten  Phase der 
Industrialisierung," in W.  Riiegg  and O.  Neuloh,  eds., Zur soziologischen  Theorie und 
Analyse des 19.  Jahrhunderts  (Gottingen,  1971), pp. 201-5. 
45.  Wurttembergische  Jahrbiicher  (Stuttgart, 1847),  pp.  i79ff.  Well  over  a  thousand 
tradesmen and tavern keepers also had their businesses  forcibly sold off in the same period. 
46. Schwdbische  Kronik, 1848, p. 1130; T. Schnurre, Die wurttembergischen  Abgeordneten 
in der  konstituirenden  deutschen  Nationalversammlung  zu Frankfurt  am  Main (Stuttgart, 1912), 
p. 9. 
47. See W.  Zorn, "Typen und Entwicklungskrafte deutschen Unternehmertums," in 
K. E. Born, ed., Moderne  deutsche  Wirtschaftsgeschichte  (Cologne,  1966), pp. 36, 429; W. 
Ehmer,  Sudwestdeutschland  als Einheit und Wirtschaftsraum  (Stuttgart, 1930), pp. 48-49, 
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ceptions.  Many  reconciled  themselves  to  a  drop  into  the  wage-earning 
proletariat,  or?as  lowly  Alleinmeister?to  a  position  where  they  were 
no  better  than  wage  earners,  delivering  standardized  goods  to  the  fac? 
tory  or  retailer  rather  than  direct  to  the  customer,  while  those  who 
continued  to  struggle  against  the  growing  concentration  of  production 
and  a  shortage  of  capital  looked  to  the  political  parties  for  special  pro? 
tection.  The  continuing  importance  of  agriculture  in  Catholic  areas 
enabled  an  especially  large  number  of  small  crafts  to  maintain  marginal 
existences  on  local  peasant  custom. 
Prior  to  1895  the  Center  had  made  a strong  appeal  to  these  men,  and 
in  subsequent  years  it  sought  on  their  behalf  a  positive,  interventionist 
state  role  in  the  economy,  with  the  use  of  fiscal  and  other  levers  to 
modify  the  terms  on  which  large  and  small  concerns  competed.  It  re- 
sponded  to  the  demands  ofthe  artisan  workshops  by  helping  to  bring 
about  a change  in  the  bidding  system  used  by  public  authorities,  so  that 
large  firms  with  the  lowest  bids  were  not  automatically  awarded  con- 
tracts;  and  it  welcomed  the  introduction  in  Wurttemberg  ofthe  1897 
Reich  law  partially  restoring  the  guild  system,  which  it  had  itself  helped 
to  pilot  through  the  Reichstag  with  Conservative  support.  The  object 
in  both  cases  was  to  confer  on  the  craftsman  special  protection  against 
the  impact  of  competition  in  the  free  market;  and  the  same  intention 
underlay  support  for  Wurttemberg's  master  bookbinders,  who  were 
trying  to  maintain  their  craft  monopoly  in  the  binding  of  schoolbooks, 
hymnbooks,  and  religious  calendars  against  interlopers  such  as  school? 
teachers,  school  inspectors,  and  sacristans.48 
Characteristic  of  the  Center's  solicitude  for  Mittelstand  concerns  was 
the  attempt  to  prop  up  the  traditional  brewing  industry  in  the  state.  In 
this  branch  of  production  concentration  was  far  advanced,  the  market 
dominated  by  a  number  of  large  firms  utilizing  technical  innovations 
beyond  the  reach  of  the  smaller  brewer.49  The  Center  electorate  in- 
48. Politische Zeitfragen,  4  (Stuttgart, 1900), pp.  199-200. 
49. Sophisticated brewery  equipment,  such as copper cooling  vats, was manufactured 
in Wurttemberg  and found large markets overseas, including the U.S.A.  The Feuerbach 
suburb of Stuttgart was a major center. See Klein,  "Industrie und Handel. Bergbau," in 
V. Bruns, ed.,  Wurttemberg  unter  der  Regierung  Konig Wilhelms  II (Stuttgart, 1916), p. 818. 
On  large Stuttgart brewing  cartels, like the  Siegelberger Aktienbrauerei-Wulle  group, 
with  a combined  share capital in 1906 of 3.75 million  Marks, see the report in Deutsches 
Volksblatt,  Dec.  3, 1906. On  the parallel movements  toward  concentration  in Bavaria, 
W.  Zorn,  Kleine  Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte  Bayerns, 1806-1933 (Munich-Pasing, 
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cluded  two  important  groups  who  wanted  to  see  the  taxation  system 
altered  in  their  favor.  There  were,  first,  the  family  brewers,  peasants  or 
artisans  with  a  small  plot  of  land,  who  produced  enough  beer  domes- 
tically  for  their  own  needs,  with  a little  extra.  In  the  party  heartland  of 
Oberschwaben  there  were  700  such  family  brewers  in  Adolf  Grober's 
constituency,  Riedlingen;  556  in  Biberach;  and  372  in  Leutkirch.  Two 
other  predominantly  Catholic  areas  represented  by  the  Center  con? 
tained  the  largest  number  of  family  brewers  in  the  state:  Neresheim, 
with  over  700,  and  Ellwangen,  with  more  than  i,ooo.50  The  main  area 
of  concern  for  this  group  was  the  lack  of  exemption  in  the  malt  tax  for 
Weissbier,  the  main  domestically  brewed  beer.  The  second  group  was 
that  of  medium-sized  businesses  who  were  finding  it  difficult  to  survive 
in  competition  with  large  rivals.  In  Ehingen,  for  example,  where  "beer 
brewing  [had]  always  been  an  important  concern,"  an  official  report 
recorded  a  large  drop  in  the  number  of  independent  breweries  in  the 
course  ofthe  nineteenth  century.51  The  main  demand  from  this  interest 
was  for  favorable  differentials  in  the  incidence  ofthe  malt  tax,  and  a ban 
in  the  preparation  of  beer  on  the  use  of  surrogates  like  rice,  which  af- 
forded  advantages  of  cost  over  malt  barley,  but  only  to  the  large  enter? 
prises  which  could  raise  the  initial  capital  to  invest  in  their  application.52 
Center  deputies  from  the  constituencies  involved  were  active  in 
bringing  these  grievances  before  the  Landtag.  In  1895  a  Center  bill 
incorporating  the  brewers'  demands,  and  an  interpellation  of  the  gov? 
ernment  along  the  same  lines,  were  instrumental  in  the  drawing  up  ofa 
government  bill,  strongly  supported  by  the  Center,  which  banned  malt 
surrogates  entirely,  and  fixed  a  scale  of  tax  liability  advantageous  to 
middle-sized  concerns.53  In  the  years  up  to  1906  the  party  could  claim 
with  justification  that  its  efforts  had  slowed  down  the  "swallowing  up 
of  small  concerns"  (der gewerbliche  Aufsaugungsprozess):  in  that  time  the 
number  of  breweries  diminished  by  only  287,  compared  with  a figure 
50. See the speech of Kaspar Vogler,  Center deputy for Neresheim, 33 LT, PBII,  pp. 
1071-72,50 S.,June 21,1895; and on the traditional strength of brewing in the Laupheim 
and Waldsee areas,  E. Schwab, P. Weiss, K. Holtermann, et al., 100Jahre  Obersciwabische 
Industrie-  und Handelskammer  Ravensburg  1867-1967 (Ravensburg, 1967), p. 157. 
51. Das  Konigreich Wurttemberg:  Eine Beschreibung  nach Kreisen, Oberdmtern  und Ge- 
meinden.  Herausgegeben  von dem  K. Statistischen  Landesamt,  4 vols.  (Stuttgart, 1904), 4: 97. 
52. For the brewers' demands, see the report ofthe  1899 annual general meeting ofthe 
Wiirttemberg  brewers in Biberach, Ipf-Zeitung,  June 7, 1899. 
53. Motion of Dender  (Wangen), to ban malt surrogates, 33 LT, BB III, p. 529, Beilage 
5; Initiativantrag  Vogler  und Genossen,  33 LT, BB III, p. 491, Beilage 42 (on the malt tax); 
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of  463  in  the  same  length  of  time  prior  to  the  introduction  ofthe  new 
law  in  1899.54  In  1909,  when  tax  levels  in  the  state  had  to  be  adjusted  to 
new  Reich  financial  reforms,  and  both  government  and  Landtag  com? 
mittee  (led  by  committee  reporter,  Social  Democrat  Lindemann)  de? 
cided  to  remove  the  differentials,  it  was  the  Center  which  led  the? 
eventually  unsuccessftd?opposition  in  committee  and  on  the  floor  of 
the  lower  house.55 
In  the  measures  by  which  it  sought  to  protect  the  independent  artisan 
or  brewer,  the  Center  not  only  ran  up  against  Progressive  believers  in 
the  unfettered  development  of  industry  and  commerce.  Like  the  Pro? 
gressives,  the  Social  Democrats  viewed  the  small  man  as  an  outmoded 
figure  from  a  preindustrial  era,  doomed  to  extinction  in  the  struggle 
against  larger,  more  competitive  rivals,  and  vainly  trying  to  turn  the 
clock  back  by  appealing  to  the  government  for  special  privileges.  It 
opposed  attempts  to  create  sheltered  enclaves  where  inefficient  and 
marginal  producers  could  resist  the  effects  of  the  market;  and  on  all 
issues  of  this  kind  it  aligned  itself  unequivocally  with  the  Progressives 
and  the  captains  of  industry  who  provided  so  many  of  their  leaders. 
Center  and  Social  Democrats  were  also  divided  on  the  conflict  within 
the  workshop  itself,  between  master  craftsmen  on  the  one  hand,  jour- 
neymen  and  apprentices  on  the  other.  At  the  root  of  the  Center's 
critique  of  capitalist  society  lay  hostility  to  the  idea  ofthe  necessity  of 
class  conflict,  symbolized  for  the  party  by  the  industrial  code  of  the 
new  Reich  (operative  in  the  individual  states),  which  replaced  the  terms 
"master"  and  "journeyman"  with  those  of  "employer"  and  "em? 
ploy  ee."  In  trying  to  preserve  the  independent  artisan,  the  Center  was 
led  into  a vigorous  attack  on  the  idea  of  "trade  freedom,"  which  it  said 
had  disrupted  and  undermined  the  old,  harmonious  relations  of  the 
workshop.56  But  the  trade  freedom  which,  as  we  have  seen,  was  at- 
tacked  by  artisans  even  before  1848,  and  which  the  Center  consistently 
opposed,  had  in  fact  provided  an  opportunity  for  numerous  journey- 
men  and  apprentices  to  escape  from  the  tutelage  of  their  masters,  and 
establish  their  own  businesses;  or,  alternatively,  to  enter  the  ranks  of 
54- 37 LT,  PB  VI, p. 6167, 227 S., Aug. 9,1909. 
55. In committee  the party repeated the demand of family brewers for exemption,  and 
asked for a 10 percent reduction in the malt tax for producers in the 250-500  dz. band. 
37 LT,  BB  VII, p. 70, Beilage 433. 
56. A  very  typical  statement  of  this  case is to  be  found  in  the  article "Zur Hand- 
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skilled  workers  and  repairers,  selling  their  labor  on  the  market  at  better 
rates  than  they  had  enjoyed  before.57  The  policy  of  the  Center  made 
little  appeal  to  either  of  these  groups.  Those  who  had  set  themselves  up 
independently  would,  in  many  cases,  have  been  willing  to  join  the 
artisan  cooperatives  advocated  by  the  Center,  but  ventures  of  this  kind 
usually  foundered  on  the  reluctance  ofthe  larger,  established  masters  to 
share  their  resources.58  Meanwhile,  for  flouting  the  authority  of  guild 
and  master,  the  newcomers,  like  those  who  had  identified  themselves 
with  the  skilled  working  class,  often  found  themselves  castigated  by  the 
Center  for  disloyalty  to  the  Handwerkerstand.  When  the  party  spoke  for 
the  interests  ofthe  artisan,  it  was  very  much  master  craftsmen  it  had  in 
mind.  The  legislation  of  1897  was  aimed  at  restoring  some  ofthe  pa- 
ternalistic  discipline  and  self-government  within  the  guild  which  had 
been  abandoned  in  the  business  codes  and  practices  ofthe  previous  three 
decades,  while  the  introduction  ofthe  Befahigungsnachweis59  improved 
the  position  of  masters  at  the  cost  of  closing  the  door  on  the  ambitions 
of  journeymen  and  apprentices. 
In  Wurttemberg,  as  in  the  Reich  generally,  the  relations  between 
masters  and  men  in  the  years  after  1890  were  frequently  worse  in  small 
workshops  than  in  larger  factories.  At  the  purely  tactical  level,  trade 
57- With  the rising consumption  of  such articles as household furniture and fittings, 
bicycles, clocks, and watches, the scope for repairs was never greater. There were also 
many examples of artisans  who  had accepted a position as skilled outworkers for large 
concerns and relinquished ideas of  "independence." Wilhelm  Keil, later Social Demo? 
cratic leader in  Wurttemberg,  served in  his youth  as an apprentice under one  such 
Zwischenmeister  near Hamburg, who produced only ladies' umbrella handles. W. Fischer, 
Quellen zur Geschichte  des deutschen  Handwerks  (Gottingen, 1957), p. 171. The raw mate? 
rials were delivered, and the finished articles collected, by a wholesaler. Theodor  Heuss 
spent six weeks ofa  school holiday in Heilbronn working with a carpenter whose work? 
shop turned out cupboards for a large furniture store. Th. Heuss, Preludes  to Life: Early 
Memoirs,  trans. M. Bullock  (London, 1955), p. 87. 
58. H.  Criiger,  Vortag  uber  gewerbliches  Genossenschaftswesen,  Warenbazare  und Gross- 
warenhandler  gehalten auf dem 41. Verbandstag  Wurtt. Gewerbevereins  in Calw im Oktober 
1899 (Stuttgart, 1899), p. 28; A. Gemming,  Das Handwerkergenossenschaftswesen  in Wiirt? 
temberg  (Stuttgart, 1911), p. 82. 
59. The revision ofthe  Reichsgewerbeordnung  (RGO) in 1897 did not go far enough for 
many in the artisan  movement,  who  continued to demand changes in Article 129 ofthe 
RGO which would allow only those with the title of "master" to supervise apprentices. 
This change?the  so-called kleiner  Befdhigungsnachweis?became  law  in  1908: it repre? 
sented a significant move  away from the concept of freedom of trade, although it still 
failed to satisfy extreme artisan demands. See Wernicke, pp. 834f?; E. Aufmkolk,  "Die 
gewerbliche  Mittelstandspolitik  des  Reiches  (unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung  der 
Nachkriegszeit,"  (Inaugural diss., University  of Miinster, 1930), pp. 15-16. David  G.  Blackhourn  243 
union  organizers  could  see  the  advantage  of  undertaking  industrial  ac? 
tion  against  smaller  employers  who  lacked  the  resources  to  resist  a pro- 
longed  dispute.  But  there  were  deeper  reasons  for  this  situation:  on  the 
one  hand,  employees  in  the  workshop  resented  the  long  hours,  low 
wages,  and  heavy-handed  discipline  which  were  so  characteristic;  while, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  masters  complained  that  technical  education, 
provided  by  the  municipalities  at  special  courses,  was  robbing  them  of 
their  supply  of  labor  at  critical  times,  as  well  as  helping  to  spirit  the 
young  men  away  to  the  factories.60  If,  in  these  disputes,  the  Center 
usually  took  the  side  ofthe  master,  and  hoped  to  resurrect  the  unity  and 
"fellowship"  ofthe  workshop  under  his  control,  the  Social  Democrats 
made  great  headway  among  journeymen  and  apprentices,  to  whom  the 
traditional  guild  system  had  little  to  offer.  Again,  even  among  those 
who  were  masters,  there  were  enormous  differences:  the  Center  ad- 
dressed  itself  to  those  who  were  determined  to  retain  their  sense  of  inde? 
pendence  and  Mittelstand  status,  while  for  those  who  had  reconciled 
themselves  to  a  situation  which  was  effectively  proletarian,  especially 
the  struggling  Alleinmeister,  the  Social  Democrats  were  often  probably 
more  attractive.  Once  again,  the  line  of  division  between  Center  and 
Social  Democrats  was  between  those  who  regarded  themselves  as mem? 
bers  ofthe  Mittelstand  and  those  who  were  beginning  to  see  themselves 
primarily  as  working  class.61 
IV 
The  third  branch  ofthe  Mittelstand  whose  interests  helped  to  determine 
the  shape  of  Center  policy  was  that  made  up  by  retailers;  and  few 
60. On disaffection and indiscipline among  apprentices and journeymen,  F. Gerhardt, 
"Gewerbe  und  Handwerk,"  in  Bruns,  pp.  867-68.  Representative  complaints  among 
masters on the schemes whereby  apprentices were released from work  to attend govern- 
ment-sponsored  courses in  technical  education  and  so  on,  as well  as on  the  bidding 
system, were aired at the 1904 annual general meeting  ofthe  Rottenburg  Gewerbeverein, 
reported in the Neckar-Bote, Mar. 1, 1904. 
61. It is important not  to take the claims ofthe  Mittelstandspolitiker  at face value, and 
assume  that  artisans?the  Handwerkerstand?constituted a  harmonious,  homogeneous 
group. Quite apart from the unmistakable evidence of growing  class conflict in the work? 
shop, between  masters and men, there was also a growing  differentiation between  larger 
and  smaller  independent  artisans. While  the  Center  (like  the  Conservatives  and Anti- 
Semites)  appealed to  those artisans who  kept up the struggle for standesgemdss  respect- 
ability, many of those who  had been reduced to indigence  drew the political conclusion 
that their future lay in identifying  with the industrial working  class and the SPD. See my 
article, "The Mittelstand  in German Society and Politics,  1871-1914,"  Social History, no. 
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groups  were  more  vociferous.  As  early  as 1895,  for  example,  the  Center 
candidate  in  Waldsee,  Anton  Beutel,  was  faced  with  special  demands 
from  the  highly  organized  butchers  and  bakers,62  as well  as from  tavern 
keepers  looking  for  repeal  of  a  special  tax  levied  in  Wurttemberg  on 
sales  of  wine  (the  Umgeld).  The  Center  press  deplored  this  rash  of 
interest  politics,  and  Beutel  used  the  columns  ofthe  Waldseer  Wochen- 
blatt  to  explain  why  he  could  not  at  that  stage  accede  to  the  tavern 
keepers'  wishes.63  But  the  issue  was  sufficiently  sensitive  for  the  party  to 
take  two  representatives  of  the  interest  into  the  parliamentary  group, 
and  to  take  up  another  of  their  complaints?the  sale  of  bottled  beer  by 
non-tavern  keepers. 
Shopkeepers  did  particularly  well  out  of  the  Center.  Legislative  re? 
strictions  on  the  sales  methods  of  large  retail  concerns  were  passed  in  the 
Reichstag  with  Center  and  Conservative  support,  in  a law  which  sub- 
stantially  enlarged  the  concept  of  "unfair  competition"  (Unlauterer 
Wettbewerb).  When  this  failed  to  quell  the  flood  of  local  complaints 
about  advertising,  free  offers,  and  the  ubiquitous  traveling  salesmen 
with  their  order  books,64  the  Center  ran  a vigorous  press  campaign  on 
the  evils  of  modern  commercial  methods,  and  took  up  the  issue  at  state 
level.  It  interpellated  the  government  for  statistics  on  the  abuse  of  the 
law,  asking  that  the  available  powers  be  more  widely  used,  and  divided 
the  Landtag  on  a motion  calling  on  the  Wurttemberg  delegation  in  the 
Bundesrat  to  move  for  even  tighter  restrictions  on  traveling  salesmen? 
the  "itinerants  in  patent  leather  shoes"65  who  had  replaced  the  tradi? 
tional  pedlars  and  hawkers  as the  scourge  ofthe  respectable  small  family 
business.  Here,  as  in  many  other  spheres,  the  conservative  morality  of 
Center  politicians  reinforced,  and  was  reinforced  by,  the  economic 
interests  of  the  party's  followers.  The  large  concerns  which  sent  out 
representatives  were  also  directly  penalized  in  Wurttemberg  as a result 
62. Ofthe  fifty-six producer and sales cooperatives which existed in Wurttemberg by 
1907, twenty-five  were accounted for by butchers and bakers. There had been a butchers* 
cooperative in Stuttgart as early as 1874. L. Dessauer, "Die Industrialisierung  von Gross- 
Stuttgart" (Ph.D.  diss., University  of Tubingen,  1916), p.  58. On  the bakers, see also 
Criiger, p. 24. 
63.  Waldse'er  Wochenblatt,]an.  26, 1895. 
64. For four examples among many, see Waldse'er  Wochenblatt,  Feb. 13, 1897 ("Vom 
Oberland, Feb. 6"),  and Apr.  7,  1898  (report of  Gewerbeverein  meeting);  Ipf-Zeitung, 
June 14,1899  (report ofGewerbeverein  meeting),  and June 2,1900  (Rottweil Handelskam- 
mer  meeting). 
65. The phrase is that of Center deputy Karl Walter, 37 LT, PBI, p. 621,26 S., May 17, 
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of  Center  efforts:  after  years  of  lobbying,  the  party  succeeded  in  bring- 
ing  onto  the  statute  books  a progressive  tax  on  the  turnover  of  all  stores 
and  companies  with  subsidiary  branches.  As  a  further  step  to  alleviate 
the  difficulties  of  small  shopkeepers,  the  Center  deputy  Schick  intro- 
duced  a  bill,  with  official  party  backing,  the  passing  of  which  enabled 
the  removal  from  station  platforms  of  automatic  vending  machines,  a 
serious  irritant  to  local  tradesmen.  Its  implementation  led  to  the  re? 
moval  of  machines  from  116  sites.66 
The  class  of  small  shopkeepers  which  the  Center  was  trying  so  assidu- 
ously  to  keep  afloat  was  swollen  in  Wurttemberg?as  in  every  other 
state?by  the  continual  entry  into  it  of  artisans  who  had  been  squeezed 
out  ofthe  productive  sector  ofthe  economy.  For  many,  ownership  of 
an  inn  or  grocer's  shop  represented  a last,  desperate  attempt  to  salvage 
Mittelstand  respectability  and  avoid  the  drop  into  the  ranks  of  wage  and 
salary  earners.  Unfortunately  this  exodus  into  petty  retailing  made  little 
economic  sense.  Even  the  Center,  which  defended  the  survival  of  a 
large  Mittelstand  on  social  grounds,  admitted  that  the  body  of  small  re- 
tailers  contained  a large  penumbra  of  inefficient  members.67  That  many 
were  chronically  uncompetitive  was  tacitly  conceded  when  the  party 
press  was  obliged  to  fulminate  against  other  members  ofthe  Mittelstand 
who  chose  to  shop  at  the  department  and  chain  stores  because  of  the 
price  advantages  they  offered.68  Shopkeepers  who  traveled  into  the 
towns,  bought  up  department  store  stock,  and  resold  it  at  a higher  price 
in  the  small  towns  underlined  this  point  even  more.69  The  long-term 
solution  advocated  by  the  Center  was  to  encourage  shopkeepers,  like 
artisans,  to  pool  their  resources  in  sales  cooperatives.  These  efforts,  in 
fact,  were  largely  a  failure:  disunity,  shortage  of  starting  capital,  and 
trade  jealousy  inhibited  the  growth  of  such  cooperatives  among  shop? 
keepers  even  more  than  among  artisans.  But  there  can  be  little  doubt 
that  where  they  were  successful?especially  among  butchers  and  bakers 
?the  result,  anyway,  was  higher  prices  for  the  consumer.  In  Schram- 
berg,  for  example,  a bakers'  cooperative  was  reported  as  being  so  suc? 
cessful  that  it  "prepared  the  way  for  a  rise  in  prices  which  would  not 
66. Politische Zeitfragen,  4  (Stuttgart, 1900), p.  180. 
67. See Kiene's speech, 35 LT, PBIV,  p. 2678,122 S.,July  5,1902. The Ipf-Zeitung also 
stressed this point when  it carried (May 19, 1899) a summary ofa  Hanover  Chamber of 
Commerce  report on  the dangerous mushrooming  of  small retail concerns in all parts 
of Germany. 
68. See Ipf-Zeitung, Mar. 20, 1899 ("Viel mehr zusammenhalten"). 
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have  been  possible  for  the  individual  [baker]."70  It  was  hardly  surpris? 
ing,  therefore,  that  the  Social  Democrats  also  sided  here  with  the  Pro? 
gressives  against  the  Center,  in  defending  the  advantages  of  the  large 
stores  and  attacking  those  who  raised  the  price  of  goods  in  the  shop. 
Karl  Kloss,  Social  Democratic  deputy  for  Stuttgart,  singled  out  the 
bakers  for  special  attention,  as  a  group  by  whom  the  working-class 
consumer  was  "milked  in  an  outrageous  way."71 
It was  the  bakers,  too,  who  were  prominent  in  the  clash  between  the 
Mittelstand  shopkeepers  and  working-class  consumer  cooperatives  in 
Wurttemberg,  a  struggle  which  also  embroiled  Center  and  Social 
Democrats  on  opposite  sides.  The  cooperative  movement  in  the  state 
had  two  distinct  wings:  the  producer  and  sales  cooperatives  (including 
peasant  cooperative  ventures)  of  the  independent  Mittelstand,  which 
grew  out  ofthe  efforts  of  Schulze-Delitzsch;  and  the  cooperatives  ofthe 
working  and  white-collar  classes,  pioneered  in  Wurttemberg  by  Ed- 
uard  Pfeiffer.72  In  the  early  years  the  two  had  worked  uneasily  together 
within  the  same  umbrella  organization,  but  as  a more  clearly  differen- 
tiated  class  society  emerged,  the  conflict  between  producer  and  con? 
sumer  grew  sharper  and  the  pressure  increased  for  a formal  separation 
ofthe  two  wings.  In  1902  the  Reich  consumer  movement  seceded  and 
began  to  grow  rapidly  in  size.  By  1913  it  had  one  hundred  thousand 
members  in  Wurttemberg,  and  had  moved  from  its  original  distribu- 
tory  role  to  become  a large-scale  producer  in  its  own  right,  especially  of 
bread,  other  foodstuffs,  and  shoes.73  Early  German  socialists  like  Lassalle 
had  been  suspicious  of  the  kleinbiirgerlich  character  of  the  cooperative 
movement;  but  the  split  of  1902  quickened  an  already  growing  Social 
Democratic  interest  in  the  consumer  cooperatives,  and  led  to  an  in- 
70. Gemming,  p. 79. 
71. 33 LT,  PB III, p. 1736, 80 S., May 9,1895. 
72. On the difference in character of the two  wings,  see K. Bittel, Eduard  Pfeijfer  und 
die deutsche  Konsumgenossenschaftsbewegung:  Schriften  des Vereinsfur Sozialpolitik, Unter- 
suchungen  iiber  Konsumvereine,  151/1  (Munich and Leipzig, 1915), p. 101. 
73. On membership figures, see F. Feuerstein, Geschichte  des Verbandes  wurttembergischer 
Konsumvereine  1904-1929 (Stuttgart, 1929), p. 14. In 1889 the Stuttgart cooperative had 
fifteen food shops, in 1914 thirty-eight. In 1902 it opened its first shoe shop and added a 
second in 1908. But its bakery showed the most spectacular  expansion: in 1900 the new, 
enlarged premises on the Schlosserstrasse  were using 1.8 million kg. of flour annually; by 
1905 this had risen to 2.8 million,  and by  1913 to 4 million.  E. Hasselmann, Und trug 
hundertfdltiger  Frucht:  Ein Jahrhundert  konsumgenossensch.  Selbsthilfe  in Stuttgart  (Stuttgart, 
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creasing  interlocking  of  socialist  party  and  cooperative  movement.74 
To  socialists  like  the  Social  Democratic  deputy  and  consumer  coopera? 
tive  chairman  in  Wurttemberg,  Franz  Feuerstein,  the  organization,  like 
the  trade  unions,  provided  evidence  of  the  increasing  self-confidence 
and  strength  of  those  "consuming  masses"  who  had  been  reduced  to 
selling  their  labor.75 
The  scale  of  cooperative  turnover  soon  provoked  opposition  from 
the  Mittelstand:  the  working-class  cooperative  became  for  petty  retailers 
a symbol  of  their  oppression  as potent  as the  Jewish-owned  department 
store.  In  Wurttemberg  the  Schutzverein  fur  Gewerbe  und  Handel,  the 
Artisan  Chambers,  and  especially  the  bakers'  association  (the  Backerver- 
band)  were  active  petitioning  the  government,  running  press  campaigns, 
and  lobbying  sympathetic  parties  in  order  to  achieve  a  curtailment  of 
cooperative  business.76  The  Conservatives  supported  these  demands;  and 
the  Center,  so  diligent  in  its  efforts  to  establish  cooperatives  among 
peasants,  artisans,  and  shopkeepers,  was  a  consistent  supporter  of  mea? 
sures  designed  to  obstruct  the  consumer  branch.  In  1896  Center  and 
Conservatives  obtained  certain  legal  restrictions  on  their  operations, 
and  in  the  following  years  the  two  parties  worked  together  in  the 
Wurttemberg  Landtag  to  broaden  the  campaign.  No  less  than  agricul? 
tural  tariffs,  this  issue  pointed  up  the  conflict  between  the  Mittelstand- 
orientated  Center  and  the  working  class-based  Social  Democrats. 
An  examination  of  the  Center  Party's  economic  and  social  policies  in 
Wurttemberg  between  1895  and  1914  suggests,  therefore,  a  pattern 
similar  to  that  obtaining  in  the  Reich  generally.  Having  mobilized 
politically  the  peasant,  small-business,  and  retailing  Mittelstand,  the 
Center  found  itself  committed  to  a  range  of  policies  on  agricultural 
tariffs,  the  reintroduction  of  the  guild  system,  changes  in  the  bidding 
74- The  growing  acceptance by  the  SPD  of  the  political  role  of  the  consumer  co- 
operatives had sound doctrinal support fiom  Marx, who  at Geneva in 1865 praised the 
movement  as an important  stage in  the  development  of  working-class  consciousness. 
F. Feuerstein, Denkschrift  iiber die Bedeutung  des Genossenschaftswesens  fiir  die Entwicklung 
der Gemeindewirtschaft:  Mit besonderer  Beriicksichtigung  der Konsumgenossenschaften  (Stutt? 
gart, 1920), pp. 21-22. 
75. Feuerstein, Geschichte,  p. 4. 
76. Hasselmann, p. 68; Feuerstein, Geschichte,  p. 4. In 1912 the Wurttemberg  Schutz- 
verein organized a boycott  of the candidates fiom  parties which  had refused to support 
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system,  department  store  and  consumer  cooperative  taxation,  all  of 
which  tended  to  shelter  the  small  producer  or  distributor  at  the  expense 
ofthe  consumer,  who  was  obliged  to  pay  a higher  price  for  the  goods 
he  purchased.  Whatever  agreement  might  have  existed  in  other  political 
or  constitutional  areas,  this  Center  policy  was  bound  to  antagonize  the 
left,  and  especially  the  Social  Democrats. 
One  consequence  of  Center  Mittelstandspolitik  at the  Reich  level  was  a 
striking  loss  of  support  for  the  party  among  the  Catholic  working  class, 
to  which  it  offered  the  crumbs  of  its  economic  and  social  policy,  and 
nothing  that  was  not  available  from  the  Social  Democrats.  In  the  bar? 
gaining  over  the  Biilow  tariffs,  for  example,  the  Center  hoped  to  mol- 
lify  Catholic  workers  by  setting  aside  some  ofthe  revenue  from  meat, 
rye,  and  wheat  duties  for  a  widows'  and  orphans'  insurance  scheme. 
But,  as  Progressive  deputy  Roesicke  pointed  out,  600  million  Marks 
was  being  taken  from  consumers,  and  only  78  million  Marks  returned 
to  this  fund.77  The  idea?taken  from  "agrarian"  academic  Adolph 
Wagner?was  mere  window  dressing:  it proved  a complete  failure,  and 
a  comprehensive  insurance  scheme  had  to  be  introduced  in  1911.  By 
1912  the  Center  proportion  of  total  votes  east  at Reichstag  elections  had 
fallen  from  27.9  percent  in  1874to  16-4  percent,  its  share  ofthe  Catholic 
vote  from  the  Kulturkampf  high-point  of  83  percent  to  54.6  percent.78 
Most  of  this  loss  consisted  of  desertions  among  the  Catholic  working 
class.  After  the  1912  election,  which  the  Center  fought  in  close  alliance 
with  the  Conservatives  in  defence  of  the  agrarian  finance  reforms  of 
1909,  the  party  had  retained  only  Augsburg,  Essen,  Krefeld,  Monchen- 
Gladbach,  Aachen,  and  Miinster  of  the  large  urban-industrial  constit- 
uncies  it  had  formerly  held:  Cologne,  Munich,  Wiirzburg,  Strassburg, 
Dusseldorf,  Mainz,  Metz,  and  Miilhausen  had  all  been  lost  to  the  Social 
Democrats. 
It would  be  wrong,  however,  to  see  this  neglect  of  Catholic  working- 
class  interests  solely  as an  effect  of  pressure-group  demands  on  the  Cen- 
77- K. D.  Barkin, The Controversy  over German  Industrialization  1890-1902 (Chicago, 
1970), p. 239. 
78. That the Center was able to obtain a regular hundred Reichstag deputies at a time 
when its share ofthe  poll was declining was the result of two  factors: the concentration 
ofthe  Catholic electorate in compact areas; and (more important) the favoring of rural 
and small-town  areas by a division of constituencies which  remained unchanged from 
1871 to  1914. Thus die  party enjoyed  about a quarter more  seats in the Wilhelmine 
Reichstag than it would have obtained under a proportional representation system such 
as operated in the Weimar  Republic. J. Schauff, Die  deutschen  Katholiken und die Zen- 
trumspartei  (Cologne,  1928), pp. 20-23. David  G.  Blackhourn  249 
ter.  Although  it  made  sense  electorally  to  satisfy  those  interests  which 
were  most  strongly  represented  among  its  supporters,  those  responsible 
for  formulating  party  policy  also  had  a prior  concern  with  the  survival 
ofa  strong  Mittelstand.  While  eschewing  the  rabidly  antiindustrial  stance 
ofthe  agrarian  right,  the  Center  leadership  was  alarmed  at the  social  and 
moral  ferment  which  accompanied  industrialization.  They  did  not  be? 
lieve  that  preindustrial  economic  and  social  relations  could  be  recon- 
stituted,  but  they  would  have  liked  to  arrest  the  rapid  development  of 
German  society,  prevent  the  war  of  "all  against  all,"  and  encourage 
every  man  to  be  a contented  member  of  his  own  Stand.  The  Mittelstand 
of  moderately  prosperous,  frugal,  and  independent  men  was  therefore 
of  great  symbolic  importance  to  the  Center.  If  nurtured,  it  would  sup- 
posedly  act  as  a  healthy  bulwark  against  both  the  extravagances  of 
plutocracy  and  the  dangerous,  revolutionary  urges  of  a  "dependent" 
working  class  with  no  real  stake  in  the  social  order.79  In  effect,  Center 
politicians  endowed  the  Mittelstand  with  the  qualities  ofa  general  class. 
In  this,  too,  the  Social  Democrats  and  Center  were  at  odds.  For  the 
Social  Democrats  had,  in  the  proletariat,  their  own  general  class.  While 
the  Center  saw  the  worker  as  a degraded  artisan,  the  Social  Democrats 
viewed  the  artisan  as  a potential  proletarian.  In  Wilhelmine  Germany 
the  struggle  was  joined  between  the  two,  not  only  over  the  representa? 
tion  of  different  interests,  but  over  rival  conceptions  of  how  society  was 
to  develop.  Only  with  the  coming  of  the  Weimar  Republic  was  this 
conflict  tempered.  The  Social  Democrats  found  the  clerical  worker 
deaf  to  their  entreaties,  unwilling  to  consider  himself  a  black-coated 
species  of  proletarian;  and  the  "two-fifths  barrier"  undercut  the  idea  of 
a  proletarian  general  class  at  the  polls.  The  Center,  viewing  the  same 
phenomenon  from  an  opposite  angle,  could  see  that  the  clerical  worker 
it  had  often  formerly  despised  for  his  "dependence"  was  in  fact  reliably 
conservative  in  his  social  attitudes;  and  a  growth  of  party  organization 
among  black-coated  workers  was  one  result  of  this  realization.  In  the 
Wilhelmine  political  arena,  however,  Social  Democrats  and  Center 
faced  each  other  across  a  starker  divide,  the  one  as  buoyant  champion 
ofthe  working  class,  the  other  as  defiant  defender  ofthe  Mittelstand. 
79- It was on these grounds that Grober justified  Center support for the payment  of 
Reichstag deputies: "One  should above all be concerned with  the Mittelstand,  which  has 
not  received  the representation it  deserves"  (Molt,  pp.  43-44,  n.  16).  In its programs, 
political  statements, and in debates and the party press, the  Center  took  as a principal 
starting point  of its policy  the need for the "preservation of a healthy Mittelstand." 